In the Indian constitutional scheme, one of the most intriguing recent debates revolves around whether courts can fix deadlines for the President or Governor to assent to legislation, especially in cases where there is already a judicial decision. This issue is now at the frontier of constitutional law, as the Supreme Court is hearing a Presidential reference asking whether its earlier timeline judgments survive when folded into binding doctrine.
At the heart of this debate is a tension between judicial authority, executive discretion, and legislative intent. Can the courts force constitutional actors to act within fixed time limits? Or does doing so infringe upon separation of powers and constitutional structure?
This tension is not new. It reflects a recurring constitutional question: how far can the judiciary step in to enforce constitutional responsibility without crossing into the realm of governance? The debate over timelines for assent exposes the friction between the spirit of constitutional accountability and the letter of executive prerogative.
WHAT ARE ARTICLE(S) 143, 200, 201 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
Before delving into the ongoing reference, it is important to understand the constitutional provisions at play, as they together define the framework of legislative assent and judicial advice.
1. Article 143: Article 143 of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with advisory jurisdiction, empowering the President to consult the Court. It provides that if it appears to the President that a question of law or fact has arisen, or may arise in the future, and that such a question is of public importance and it would be expedient to obtain the Court’s opinion, he may refer the matter to the Supreme Court.[1] The Court, after conducting such hearings as it deems appropriate, may then report its opinion to the President. Further, notwithstanding the proviso to Article 131,[2] the President may also refer disputes of the nature contemplated therein to the Supreme Court for its opinion, and the Court is bound, after hearing, to render its view.[3]
While such references go in the President’s name, Article 74(1) makes it clear that they are in fact made on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.[4] Further, under Article 74(2),[5] the Supreme Court cannot question whether the President acted independently or on such advice. If, however, the President were to consult the Court under Article 143 without ministerial advice, it would amount to a constitutional violation, potentially inviting impeachment proceedings.
The significance of Article 143 lies in its role as a constitutional safety valve—allowing the executive to seek judicial wisdom on contentious questions without invoking adversarial litigation. Historically, this Article has been invoked in cases of profound constitutional consequence, such as the Berubari Union (1960), the Special Reference on the Ayodhya dispute (1993), and the Cauvery Water Disputes case (1992). Each reference subtly shaped India’s constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and the executive.
2. Article 200: When a Bill passed by a State Legislature is presented to the Governor, Article 200 governs the process. The Governor may assent, withhold assent, or, in the case of non-Money Bills, return it for reconsideration. If the legislature passes the Bill again, with or without amendments, the Governor is then bound to give assent. Additionally, the Governor may reserve a Bill for the President’s consideration, and in cases where a Bill affects the powers of the High Court, reservation is mandatory.[6]
This provision was drafted to maintain federal comity, ensuring that State legislation remains within constitutional boundaries while allowing the Union executive, through the President, to exercise a check in matters of national or judicial significance. However, over the years, Governors have often been accused of using this discretion to stall politically inconvenient Bills, triggering debates about constitutional morality and accountability.
3. Article 201: When a Bill is reserved for the President under Article 201, the President may assent, withhold assent, or, in the case of non-Money Bills, return it to the State Legislature for reconsideration. The legislature must act within six months and, if it passes the Bill again with or without amendments, present it once more to the President. However, the Constitution remains silent on the President’s obligation after such reconsideration.[7]
This silence has led to practical deadlocks, where several State Bills have remained pending before the President for years, raising the question whether inaction itself violates constitutional duty. The judiciary’s recent interventions, therefore, stem from this vacuum.
IS PRESIDENT BOUND BY THE OPINION UNDER ARTICLE 143?
The marginal note to Article 143 “Power of President to Consult Supreme Court”. It makes it clear that the President is not bound by the Court’s advisory opinion. The term ‘consult’ itself indicates that the opinion is not obligatory. Although, the President usually abides by such opinions.
This discretionary character of the advisory opinion underlines the delicate nature of constitutional consultation. While non-binding, the moral and institutional weight of the Supreme Court’s advisory views often shape the executive’s approach to complex constitutional questions. As a matter of convention and prudence, Presidents have historically treated such opinions with deference.
BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT DISCUSSION
The recent constitutional debate wherein President Smt. Droupadi Murmu sought the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion under Article 143 stems from the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of T.N. v. Governor of T.N.,[8] where the Court addressed the issue of indefinite delays by Governors and the President in granting assent to Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution.
The Court ruled that the concepts of a “pocket veto” or “absolute veto” have no place within the constitutional scheme. While the Constitution does not expressly fix timelines, the Court emphasised that no constitutional authority can act in a manner that obstructs the legislative process. To ensure accountability, the Court prescribed specific time-limits:
a) If the Governor withholds assent or reserves a bill for the President’s consideration based on the advice of the State Council of Ministers, the action must be taken:
> Forthwith, but no later than 1 month from the presentation of the bill.
b) If the Governor acts contrary to the advice of the Council of Ministers:
> Withholding Assent: The bill must be returned with a message within a maximum period of 3 months.
> Reserving for President: The reservation must be made within a maximum period of 3 months.
c) When a bill is presented to the Governor again (i.e., for reconsideration after an initial return), the Governor is obliged to grant assent:
> Forthwith, but within a maximum of 1 month.
d) Reserving for President: The reservation must be made within a maximum period of 3 months.
f) Under Article 201, the President is similarly barred from exercising a pocket veto. The term “shall declare” makes it mandatory to either grant or withhold assent, and any withholding must be supported with reasons.
This judgment forms the backdrop of the present discussion, as it directly raised concerns about the balance between constitutional discretion and legislative efficiency.
The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the doctrine of constitutional trust, the idea that every constitutional functionary holds power not for personal or political ends but as a fiduciary duty owed to the people. By setting timelines, the Court sought to operationalize this doctrine and prevent paralysis in the democratic process.
PRESENT DISCUSSION
President Smt. Droupadi Murmu has sought the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion under Article 143 on the Court’s ruling in State of T.N. v. Governor of T.N.[9]She referred a series of crucial constitutional questions to the Supreme Court of India for its interpretation.
The primary objection raised by several states, including Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, and Punjab, was that the current reference was not maintainable because the constitutional questions it sought to address were already settled by the previous TN Governor judgment. For that reason, the Court repeatedly clarified its position during the hearing, stating that its role was strictly limited to answering the constitutional questions raised and that it would not be sitting in appeal over the existing TN Governor judgment.
The hearings also witnessed detailed submissions on the scope of judicial review vis-à-vis constitutional conventions. While some states supported the original judgment as a safeguard against gubernatorial inaction, others argued that fixing judicial timelines impinges upon the autonomy of constitutional offices. The Attorney General, on behalf of the Union, maintained that such matters fall within the realm of executive propriety, not judicial compulsion.
Th Supreme Court has reserved its judgment on the last day of hearing of this case. It will be a much-awaited judgment in constitutional philosophy. Let’s see what ahead!
CAN COURTS SET TIMELINES FOR BILL ASSENT, EVEN IF THERE IS ALREADY A JUDICIAL DECISION?
In the case of In the Matter of: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal[10], it was held that under the Constitution of India, once the Supreme Court has rendered a decision that is neither without jurisdiction, nor per incuriam, nor in violation of the principles of natural justice or any constitutional provision, such a ruling becomes binding under Article 141 and operates as res judicata. A reference under Article 143 cannot be used to reopen or sit in appeal over such a decision; the only recourse lies in review under Article 137, read with Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The saving clause under Article 374(2) is similarly inapplicable in this context. Accordingly, under Articles 143 and 141, the President may only seek the Court’s advisory opinion on a question not already settled by prior judicial pronouncement, as earlier decisions of the Supreme Court remain binding on all authorities, including the President.
In the case of Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012,[11] while referring to a question already decided in 2G case[12] held that, Advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 is not appellate in nature; the executive cannot seek a revision of a Supreme Court ‘decision’ but may seek clarification of its ‘view of law.’ Permitting the former would undermine judicial independence. Accordingly, this Court has held that that this Court would decline to entertain a reference if it is found to be improper, inadvisable, or undesirable; where the questions raised are purely socio-economic or political in nature, bearing no nexus to the provisions of the Constitution or lacking constitutional significance; where the issues are incapable of being answered or would serve no meaningful purpose; most importantly, where an authoritative pronouncement of this Court has already conclusively settled the matter.
In such a situation, reiterating the same question through a reference would amount to reopening what has already been decided, a course that is neither warranted nor permissible.
Then the question arises whether the court can clarify or modify previous judgments under Article 143? In order to get an answer to this question, one can look into the following discourse. In Keshav Singh case,[13] a seven-Judge Bench, while entertaining a reference under Article 143(1), dealt with a previous decision in respect of its interpretation involving a constitutional principle in respect of certain Articles, and proceeded to opine that the view expressed in Pandit MSM Sharma vs. Shri Shri Krishna Sinha case,[14] in relation to a proposition laid down in Gunupati Keshavram Reddy vs. Nafisul Hassan[15]case, was inaccurate.
PRESIDENT MURMU’S REFERENCE: CLARIFICATION OR CONSTITUTIONAL OVERREACH?
The pending Presidential Reference presents a delicate constitutional dilemma. While precedents like the Cauvery Reference caution against reopening settled questions, the Keshav Singh’s case leaves scope for clarifying the legal principles of prior rulings without disturbing their final outcomes. With the TN Governor case already issuing binding directions, the Supreme Court now faces the critical task of balancing judicial finality with its advisory role under Article 143. Whether the Court chooses to decline the Reference as inadmissible or proceeds to refine its earlier ratio, the reserved judgment promises to be a landmark in defining the contours of presidential references, separation of powers and judicial independence.
[1] Constitution of India, Article 143, (1).
[2] Constitution of India, Article 131.
[3] Constitution of India, Article 143, (2).
[4] Constitution of India, Article 74(1).
[5] Constitution of India, Article 74(2).
[6] Constitution of India, Article 200.
[7] Constitution of India, Article 201.
[8] 2025 SCC OnLine SC 770.
[9] Supra note
[10] 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2); para 85.
[11] (2012) 10 SCC 1.
[12] Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors. vs. UOI & Ors. With Subramanian Swamy vs. UOI & Ors., (2012) 3 SCC 1.
[13] AIR 1965 SC 745.
[14] AIR 1959 SC 359.
[15] (1952) 1 SCC 343.
